The parallels drawn between Enzo Maresca and Pep Guardiola come fraught with pitfalls: six opening matches in the Premier League cannot overshadow a decade of monumental achievements. Guardiola built modern Manchester City himself, revolutionising English football's approach to positional play and leaving behind a tactical and club culture for his successor. Maresca doesn’t undermine that titanic work solely through a winning streak.
However, the Italian manager is visibly addressing the weaknesses that became apparent in the later stages of Guardiola's tenure. The resounding 3-0 victory against Liverpool at Anfield saw Maresca become just the fourth manager in history to win his first six matches in the Premier League. The Citizens have scored 16 goals while conceding just five, and their winning streak across all competitions has reached eight matches.
What’s most significant isn’t merely the statistics but the stylistic versatility on display. Manchester City have triumphed through dominating possession, vertical attacks, and engaging in open shootouts — even managing over an hour with ten men at Old Trafford. Maresca isn’t just effectively replicating one of Guardiola’s game plans; he has taught his players to seamlessly switch between different styles. Where Guardiola's late City was often bogged down by a tendency to seek the complex and elegant tactical solution, Maresca approaches with more flexibility. He craves control but defines it according to the context of each specific match.
Guardiola's legacy: the foundation of structure and counter-pressing
Maresca doesn’t dismantle his predecessor’s system. Having coached the youth team at City and serving as Guardiola's assistant during the historic treble-winning season, the basic principles of his football stem from the same philosophy: creating numerical advantages in build-up, filling five vertical attacking lanes, using high and wide winger positions, and maintaining sufficient players behind the ball to control transitional phases.
The team continues to build attacks using a 3-2 structure: three players forming the first line, two deep midfielders acting as the connecting link, and five attackers engaging the opponent’s defensive block. Upon losing possession, the formation shifts into a classic 4-4-2, where the ‘number ten’ moves forward to press alongside Erling Haaland.
The resemblance to Guardiola’s championship-winning 3-2-2-3 formation is evident, but where Pep might push John Stones forward to join Rodri while leaving three defenders behind, Maresca employs a wider range of rotations:
- Matheus Nunes shifting centrally from right-back;
- Nico O’Riley starting as a left-back and becoming an attacking midfielder;
- Josko Gvardiol part of the back three, breaking into the midfield or marking the ball in the penalty area;
- Marc Guehi stepping out from defence when the midfield requires an additional playmaker.
Manchester City remain a dominant force: before their trip to Anfield, their average possession stood at 63.1%, with an expected goals (xG) rating of 2.1 and 3.4 clear-cut chances created per 90 minutes. In Liverpool, they ended the match with 65% possession and 551 passes, culminating in a 41-pass move involving all outfield players before Ryan Cherki’s goal. Maresca hasn’t abandoned possession in favour of counter-attacks — he has transformed it into a tool rather than a dogma to adhere to at all times.
Bold attacks with six players and calculated risks
In the latter stages of Guardiola’s reign, attacking with five players while maintaining a strict five-man defensive structure was common. Maresca has pushed the envelope further, frequently sending a sixth player into the front line. Elliot Anderson can be the sole holding midfielder while Enzo Fernandez pushes forward to join the attacking midfielders, along with wingers, a roaming defender, and Haaland. In this phase, the setup resembles an aggressive 3-1-5-1 rather than the more cautious 3-2-4-1.
This dramatically alters the opposing team’s midfield dynamics: if a midfielder steps out to press Anderson, space opens up behind for Fernandez or Cherki; if they hold their position, Anderson can carry the ball deeper; if the full-back narrows the space, the City winger is left in isolation for a one-on-one duel.
The benefits are significant: crowding the area around Haaland and being quick to pick up loose balls. The drawback is clear — Anderson must cover a vast area alone when possession is lost. Liverpool exploited this gap until the sending off of Ryan Gravenberch, who surged forward with the ball into open spaces. Guardiola often chose to slow the tempo or tether the full-back to the holding area in such scenarios. Maresca, however, willingly accepts the trade-off, banking on the attacking prowess to overshadow whatever threat the opposition may pose from a counter.
Wingers returning to direct threat and the rehabilitation of crossing
In Guardiola's later City, wide forwards often found themselves constrained by possession: maintaining width, waiting for runs, and playing backwards to avoid risky losses. Jeremy Doku sometimes oscillated between attempting dribbles and sticking to a prescribed geometric structure.
Maresca has simplified the task: wingers are positioned high and wide to take on opposing defenders immediately upon receiving the ball. They’re expected not just to stretch the opposing line but to take bold on-dribbles. Doku and Antoine Semenyo receive the ball against isolated full-backs, while the positioning of O’Riley, Gvardiol, or Fernandez distracts the defenders, allowing Haaland to link with the centre-backs.
At Anfield, this strategy worked exemplary: O’Riley’s runs and Gvardiol’s movements into the channels forced Liverpool to look centrally, creating spaces for Doku to shift into the right. O’Riley’s burst freed up space for Doku’s shot before Haaland’s follow-up, and later Gvardiol assisted Cherki’s goal. In Maresca’s system, a player making a forward run doesn’t always need the ball — sometimes they penetrate the box merely to create space for the dribbler.
Additionally, the team has significantly increased its crossing: prior to the match against Liverpool, the accuracy of crosses rose to an average of 5.2 per game, compared to 4.4 last season, with O’Riley and Phil Foden each contributing 1.64 successful deliveries. With Haaland spearheading the attack, the club no longer views quality crossing as a tactical failure.
Haaland no longer waiting for the perfect moment
The relationship between Haaland and Guardiola’s positional play sometimes appeared paradoxical: the club signed the world’s best striker for deep attacks, yet opponents often parked the ‘bus’, depriving him of space. The Norwegian often made runs that his teammates hesitated to reward with a pass for fear of losing possession.
Maresca demands quicker ball movement. Against Liverpool, prior to the red card, the visitors disrupted high pressing with long balls aimed at Haaland and the wingers. The aim wasn’t solely to feed him at his feet — his aerial duels pushed play forty yards away from City’s goal, creating knockdowns for Fernandez or Cherki and preventing the team from being squeezed into their own half. This forces opponents to defend across the whole pitch: if they meet the build-up high, they face a long ball over the top; if they sit deep, Anderson and Fernandez can freely progress with a positional attack.
Notably, the winning goal at Old Trafford demonstrated Maresca's composure without the ball. With ten men for 67 minutes, the Italian rapidly transformed his team into a pragmatic 4-4-1 block, bringing on athletic Iliman Ndiaye for the creative Cherki at half-time to maintain running intensity. The Citizens restricted Manchester United's counter-attack opportunities to just three shots on target throughout the match. Guardiola typically sought to regain control after dismissals purely through sustained possession. In contrast, Maresca calmly acknowledged that the best form of control in that moment was a compact and disciplined defence.
Enzo Maresca hasn’t made a revolution nor renounced the teachings of his mentor, but he has accomplished what the club desperately needed following the departures of key veterans: he has freed positional play from academic dogmatism, injected vertical aggression into the side, and reinstated the capacity to win matches of every kind.
